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WE REAP WHAT WE SOW:
THE LEGAL LIABILITY RISKS OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD
Debra M. Strauss*

I. INTRODUCTION
TIME magazine recently declared:
Biotech is the most rapidly adopted crop technology in human
history—faster than the corn hybrids introduced in the U.S. in the
1930s and faster than the planting changes that took place during
the Green Revolution.1
The latest daunting statistics for the planting of genetically modified (GM)
crops confirm “Monsanto’s stranglehold on the planet’s food chain”: 740 million
acres (300 million hectacres), equally divided between North America and the rest of
the world, mostly in Argentina and Brazil.2 In 1996, two percent of U.S. soybeans
had the Monsanto Roundup Ready® gene; in 2008, over 90 percent of the soybeans
grown in the United States contained this gene.3 In total, the current figures for GM
crops commercialized in the United States are astonishing: soy (91%), cotton (71%),
canola (88%), corn (85%), sugar beets (90%), Hawaiian papaya (more than 50%),
alfalfa (currently on hold), zucchini and yellow squash (small amount), and tobacco
(Quest® brand).4 As a consequence, the list of foods on the U.S. shelves that contain a
genetically modified ingredient is extensive, including the myriad of products derived
from any of these soybeans or corn.5
Copyright © 2010, Debra M. Strauss.
*
Associate Professor of Business Law, Charles F. Dolan School of Business, Fairfield University; B.A.,
Cornell University; J.D., Yale Law School. Professor Strauss, a former Food and Drug Law Institute
Scholar, currently teaches the legal environment of business, international law, and law and ethics. She has
also developed a course on the international law and ethics of genetically modified food.
1
Ken Stier, Global Business: How Frankenfood Prevailed, TIME, June 28, 2010, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1997448,00.html.
2
Id.
3
Food, Inc., directed by Robert Kenner (Magnolia Pictures 2009); see also Stephanie E. Cox, Note,
Genetically Modified Organisms: Who Should Pay the Price for Pollen Drift Contamination?, 13 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 401, 406 (2008) (noting 20% increase yearly in organics sales). With its Roundup Ready® seed,
Monsanto infuses each cell with a resistance to the herbicide Roundup Ready®, also sold by Monsanto.
When the fields are sprayed with this glyphosate herbicide, the weeds are killed and the GM crops are left
standing. The resulting food products retain this herbicide resistance at the genetic level. See Debra M.
Strauss, The International Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Importing Caution into the U.S.
Food Supply, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 167, 167 (2006) [hereinafter Strauss, Importing Caution].
4
Institute for Responsible Technology (IRT), GMOs in Food, http://www.responsible technology.org/
GMFree/GMODangers/GMOsinFood/index.cfm (last visited July 30, 2010) (providing a summary list of
crops, foods, and food ingredients that have been genetically modified as of May 2010); see also National
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), Agricultural Statistics Board, U.S. Department of Agriculture:
Acreage (2009), available at http://www.responsible technology.org/document Files/222.pdf? (providing
information concerning total U.S. acreage of corn, soy, wheat, and cotton).
5
IRT, supra note 4. Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) are created when the genes of one organism are
inserted into the DNA of another organism, causing the target trait to be expressed in that non-related species.
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None of these products are labeled as containing genetically modified
organisms (GMOs).6 The U.S. market readily accepts these genetically engineered
crops, while overseas they face more restrictions and fewer regulatory approvals,
although some say that has been quietly changing.7 Reflecting public attitudes as to
who should bear the risk of potential harm, “GM free zones” where GM crops cannot
be planted have been announced in countries throughout the world.8
In the United States, Monsanto has a 35% market share in corn seed, with its
GM traits implanted in 85% of all U.S. corn due to the licensing of its technology.9
With its profits recently dropping due to increased competition from China of its
herbicide glyphosate and a farmer backlash against high-priced GM seeds, Monsanto
plans to push its GM seeds even more aggressively by lowering prices for two
recently introduced lines of GM seeds (a second generation of its Roundup® tolerant
soybean and a line of herbicide-resistant and pest-resistant corn called SmartStax).10
Monsanto is counting on U.S. farmers to buy enough of this Roundup Ready®
2 Yield to plant about 15 million acres for the 2011 growing season.11 In addition, the
biotechnology industry has been capitalizing on fears of a food shortage crisis based
on population growth projections and the vulnerability of the global food supply to
weather and potential catastrophic events.12 The industry can be expected to continue
to exploit these fears to push further adoption of their GM crops.
The genetically modified (GM) plants then produce GM foods and ingredients, which now occupy a vast
majority of food products on U.S. grocery store shelves. In addition to herbicide-resistant varieties of soybeans,
canola, cotton, corn, radicchio, rice, and sugar beet, genes derived from a bacterium in the soil used as an
insecticide, Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), have been inserted into crops to induce the plant to produce a toxin
against certain insects, producing Bt-corn, Bt-cotton, Bt-potatoes, Bt-rice, and Bt-tomatoes. The United States
has also approved virus- resistant varieties of papaya, potato, and squash, along with tomato and cantaloupe
varieties containing a gene that slows the ripening process to allow fruit to ripen longer on the vine. See Strauss,
Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 167-68 (explaining this technology and examples of GM crops).
6
See Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 182-89 (discussing the U.S. laissez-faire regulatory
treatment of GMOs).
7
As Brett Begemann, international executive vice president at Monsanto explains about the gradual and
silent penetration of the European market, “Neither the government nor companies seem to see much
upside in being more candid with the public.” Stier, supra note 1. While none are as openly welcoming to
GM crops as the United States, there are now twenty-five countries that have planted biotech crops and an
additional thirty-two countries that have approved biotech imports for either animal feed or food. Id.
8
“Nearly two thousand jurisdictions in 22 countries in Europe have declared themselves GM free zones
and the same holds true for parts of New Zealand, most states in Australia, Venezuela, most of Brazil,
Angola, Sudan, and Zambia.” Jeffrey M. Smith, “The Myth and Necessity of GM Free Zones,” Spilling the
Beans, Oct 1, 2004, http://www.seedsofdeception.com/utility/showArticle/?ObjectID=195&find
=prodigene&happ=siteAdministrator [hereinafter Smith, Myth] (citing Stefania Bianchi, Anti-GM
Movement Spreads Across Europe, INTER. PRESS SERVICE, April 22, 2004).
9
Id. Although Monsanto holds the lead in the GM seed market and maintains a $1 billion R&D budget,
internationally other companies currently include Switzerland’s Syngenta, Pioneer Hi-Bred International
which is part of DuPont, Dow AgroSciences and Germany’s Bayer CropScience. “Competitors can become
cross-licensing collaborators, even partners” as the companies seek to maximize their GM seed profits. Id.
10
Scott Kilman, Monsanto’s Profit Drops 45% on Roundup Woes, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2010, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB10001424052748703426004575338602676667626.html.
11
Id.
12
See, e.g., David Thier, Is the Next Global Food Crisis Now in the Making?, July 17, 2010, available at
http://www.aolnews.com/world/article/is-the-next-global-food-crisis-now-in-the-making/19557228.
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Monsanto vigorously enforces its intellectual property rights, relentlessly
pursuing farmers with seed contracts and lawsuits against any whose fields end up
sprouting their genetically modified crops.13 Clearly Monsanto has already established
its dominance in ownership. But with great ownership comes great responsibility—and
liability. The biotech industry claims that after almost fifteen years of GM crop use,
there are no well-documented food-safety problems and no threat to biodiversity.14
However, these claims are contradicted by reported incidents of superweeds and
contamination, with potentially catastrophic events lurking on the horizon not too farfetched to envision.
Despite the many promises of the prospective benefits of this technology
that have not materialized, numerous risks to human health and the environment have
been identified.15 Potential risks include crop failures suffered by farmers, cross
pollination of neighboring farms, and increased insect resistance, as well as health
and environmental impacts on consumers.16 The National Research Council has
detailed the possible hazards that GM crops may pose in comparison to traditional
crop breeding methods.17 In citing the potential dangers of this technology, a study by
the World Health Organization (WHO) identified additional costs from the issues of
liability and compensation for economic loss due to contamination.18 Indeed, one of
13

See Debra M. Strauss, The Application of TRIPS to GMOs: International Intellectual Property Rights
and Biotechnology, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 287, 299 (2009) (analyzing the intellectual property treatment of
genetically engineered seeds as asserted by the industry and proposing a model that would
promote constructive innovation for the public benefit by encouraging “socially responsible technology”)
[hereinafter Strauss, International Intellectual Property Rights]; see also Food, Inc., supra note 3 (noting
that Monsanto has a staff of seventy-five for investigating the use of their seeds with private investigators
and a hotline to report neighbors; their frequent lawsuits for patent infringement prompt settlements with
farmers vastly outmatched in resources and scare the other farmers into compliance).
14
Stier, supra note 1.
15
See Debra M. Strauss, Defying Nature: The Ethical Implications of Genetically Modified Plants, 3 J.
FOOD L. & POL’Y 1, 7–19 (2007) (debunking the myths that this technology would reduce world hunger,
decrease pesticide usage, improve nutritional content, and increase farmers’ income and contrasting these
claims of potential benefits with the risks) [hereinafter Strauss, Ethical Implications].
16
Concerns in the international community have focused particularly on allergenicity, antibiotic resistance,
gastrointestinal problems, potential gene flow to other organisms, and destruction of biodiversity. For more
background information on this technology, including the health and environmental risks, see Strauss,
Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 169-75. See also Jeffrey M. Smith, Monsanto Whistleblower Says
Genetically Engineered Crops May Cause Disease, Spilling the Beans, August 2006, available at
http://www.seedsofdeception.com/Public/ Newsletter/Aug2006-MonsantoWhistleblowerSaysG/index.cfm
[hereinafter Smith, Whistleblower] (former Monsanto employee reporting that in GM cotton unknown
proteins had been created during the gene insertion process—“one of the many possible dangers that are
not being evaluated by the biotech industry’s superficial safety assessments”).
17
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND
REGULATION 40-103 (2000) (analyzing the potential environmental and human health implications of pestprotected plants and recommending further study).
18
World Health Organization (WHO), Modern Food Biotechnology, Human Health and Development: an
Evidence-Based Study, at 53 (June 24, 2005), available at http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/
biotech/biotech_en.pdf. The WHO study also named the following human health risks: direct health effects
(toxicity), tendencies to provoke allergic reaction (allergenicity), specific components with toxic
properties, the stability of the inserted gene, nutritional impact, increased antibiotic resistance, and any
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the most significant risks to consider is future liability from lawsuits, including
lawsuits by and against farmers and/or biotechnology companies for possible harm
and economic loss caused by bioengineered food crops. In view of the scientific
uncertainty and potential for harm, consumer claims for injuries may also arise in the
future from the failure to warn of the presence of genetically engineered components.
In analyzing the legal liability risks of GM crops and food, Part II of this
article first explores the theories of liability under which farmers and consumers can
recover for the harms caused by GMOs, including relief for their economic loss.
In Part III, this article examines the very real incidents thus far and analyzes the
lawsuits that have ensued in cases of contamination due to pollen drift and
intermingling of seeds, highlighting the most recent landmark LibertyLink® rice
litigation. Also explored are the roles of suppliers, trade associations, and
international trade, as well as bills that have been introduced at the federal and state
levels. Part IV presents policy considerations and discusses measures to manage these
risks, proposing a regulatory approach of labeling, monitoring, and a stringent premarket approval process. New legislation, preferably at the federal level, would give
more clarity to the business community and assurance to consumers, farmers, and
other stakeholders. In the absence of a stronger regulatory and statutory regime, the
common law of torts will step in to fill the void through continual lawsuits that will
plague the biotech industry. Accordingly, Part V concludes that the interests of GM
seed companies, farmers, and consumers will converge in this area to mandate greater
certainty and safety.

II. THEORIES OF LIABILITY FOR HARM CAUSED BY GMOS
Theories of liability that may be applied in cases of harm caused by GMOs
vary with the type of harm, context, and parties potentially injured as well those legally
responsible for causing the problem. Some attention has been focused on potential
liability for farmers who decide to plant GM crops, which might be contract-based
liability that may arise under their technology agreements with seed companies or
guarantees to crop purchasers or regulatory liability if their actions involve violations of
statutes or the standards and procedures issued by administrative agencies such as
approval for human consumption.19 Farmers who plant GM crops may also be liable
under tort-based theories when genetic drift or outcrossing occurs and the seed spreads to
the fields of other farmers who had no desire to plant GM crops and now face problems

unintended effects that could result from genetic modification. In addition, the study warned of potential
risks for the environment such as: “unintended effects on non-target organisms, ecosystems, and
biodiversity.” Id. at iii, 20; see also Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 169-70.
19
See DAVID R. MOELLER, GMO LIABILITY THREATS FOR FARMERS: LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE
PLANTING OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 2 (Farmers’ Legal Action Group, Inc. 2001) (focusing the
potential legal risks farmers face with genetically modified organisms). For example, a farmer who
warrantees that the crops were GMO-free may face liability for the buyer’s expenses to reject and replace
the crops, including further damages if the GM crop mingles with and contaminates other crops—possibly
entire shipments to foreign countries. Id.
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of contamination.20 In addition, as noted above, there have been numerous cases based
upon the intellectual property rights of the seed manufacturers, who have successfully
sued the farmers of the recipient fields for patent infringement despite their lack of intent
or desire to plant the patented GM seed.21 However, these types of claims only address
legal risks to farmers and not the seed companies who have created these products.
Another approach to harm caused by GM crops would direct liability onto
the seed manufacturers in potential lawsuits by non-GM farmers and even consumers.
This tort-based liability would include claims for contamination on behalf of farmers
whose fields have been tainted with unwanted GMOs due to outcrossing, migration,
commingling of seeds and the like. In empowering these farmers with a proactive
cause of action, it must be acknowledged that the ensuing lawsuits both by and
possibly against a different group of farmers—non-GM versus GM—at times would
pit neighbor against neighbor for breach of their genetic fences.22 Nonetheless, the
emphasis here is on the defendant seed company who set this situation in motion,
and, faced with the strong possibility of this form of liability, those farmers are
theoretically free to choose not to plant GM seeds in the future. The damages may be
high—especially if the plaintiff farmers face potential loss of organic certification—
both on the individual farmers’ level for injury to their crop and on the market level
for loss of a domestic or international export market.
In lawsuits for contamination from cross pollination, one can easily envision
liability through common law torts such as private and public nuisance, trespass,
negligence, and strict liability.23 For example, the situation could be viewed as a
trespass if a farmer and/or seed company knew that genetic traits from a GM crop
could enter a neighbor’s property and that genetic drift does in fact occur, causing
harm from contamination of the crop.24 Although the trespass theory has been
successfully applied in current times to other instances of pollution, on the theory that
such physical invasion of particles interferes with one’s exclusive possession of the
20

Id.; see generally Stephanie M. Bernhardt, High Plains Drifting: Wind-Blown Seeds and the Intellectual
Property Implications of the GMO Revolution, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 2, 2–6 (2005) (discussing
this type of lawsuit and facts about windblown seeds).
21
See Strauss, International Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 13, at 291-95 (discussing this use of
U.S. patent law).
22
But see Joshua B. Cannon, Note, Statutory Stones and Regulatory Mortar: Using Negligence Per Se to
Mend the Wall Between Farmers Growing Genetically Engineered Crops and their Neighbors, 67 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 653, 657 (2010) (proposing negligence per se, or statutory negligence, as a possible solution
to protect farmers whose crops are contaminated because the predictability of statutory or regulatory
standards would also benefit GM growers).
23
See generally Drew L. Keshen, Legal Liability Issues in Agricultural Biotechnology, 10 ENVTL.
LIABILITY 203 (2002) (discussing trespass, negligence, and strict liability).
24
See MOELLER, supra note 19, at 3; Cox, supra note 3, at 411 (exploring possible causes of action for
pollen-drift contamination of organic or conventional crops through private nuisance, trespass, or strict
liability, and proposing state legislation to protect farmers by holding growers and manufacturers liable for
the harm); Paul J. Heald & James Charles Smith, The Problem of Social Cost in a Genetically Modified
Age, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 87 (2006) (discussing the elements of trespass in the context of pollen drift as
requiring proof of invasion, causation, and harm).
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land, the issue of whether mere knowledge is enough or intentionality must be proven
has not been determined in this context.25 Similarly, a nuisance action would be based
on the claim that there was an invasion of the farmer’s use and enjoyment of his
land.26 A proposal to utilize the tort theory of anticipatory nuisance is appealing, as it
would allow injunctive relief to prevent the harm from occurring in the first instance. 27
However, the high standard necessary for an injunction to issue might not be
achievable as a practical matter in many cases.28
Strict liability for an unreasonably dangerous product would be particularly
appropriate, as it would not require proof of intent or negligence on the part of the
manufacturer and the causation of harm would be sufficient.29 Courts have held strict
liability to apply to comparably dangerous activities such as spraying pesticides.30
Moreover, what constitutes an “abnormally dangerous product” involves a balancing
test that would require the court to consider public policy interests.31 Arguably, as a
matter of public policy holding seed companies strictly liable would place
responsibility on those best able to control the product and ensure its safety,
providing proper incentives to prevent the harm from occurring in the future.
25
See, e.g., Roger A. McEowen, Legal Issues Related to the Use and Ownership of Genetically Modified
Organisms, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 611, 618 (2004); Richard Repp, Comment, Biotech Pollution: Assessing
Liability for Genetically Modified Crop Production and Genetic Drift, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 585, 600 (2000).
26
Thomas P. Redick & Christina G. Bernstein, Nuisance Law and the Prevention of “Genetic Pollution”:
Declining a Dinner Date with Damocles, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 328, 337 (2000) (applying nuisance law to
GM varieties not approved in EU, reasoning that a defendant who does not take reasonable steps to prevent
an interference with plaintiff’s enjoyment of property may be liable in nuisance); A. Bryan Endres,
“GMO:” Genetically Modified Organism or Gigantic Monetary Obligation? The Liability Schemes for
GMO Damages in the United States and the European Union, 22 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 453,
493-94 (2000) (noting that for private nuisance, a plaintiff may not need to demonstrate that the defendant
intended to allow pollen from genetically modified crops to cross-pollinate, and courts may refuse to
balance the genetically modified crop’s social and economic utility against its harm to the organic farmer’s
crops); Barry R. Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PENN. L. REV.
1403, 1466 (1983) (utilizing common law nuisance and injunctive measures a mechanism for governing
hazard). But see Neil Craik, Keith Culver & Norman Siebrasse, Genetically Modified Crops and Nuisance:
Exploring the Role of Precaution in Private Law, 27 BUL. SCI. TECH. & SOC. 202, 206 (2007) (arguing that
in nuisance suits for genetic contamination from GM crops, private law is poorly suited to apply the
diffuse, policy-based risk allocation considerations raised by the precautionary principle).
27
Margaret Rosso Grossman, Anticipatory Nuisance and the Prevention of Environmental Harm and
Economic Loss from GMOs in the United States, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 107, 124 (2008) (reviewing
private and public nuisance in the context of GMOs and analyzing the suitability of anticipatory nuisance
seeking an injunction to prevent future harm from a defendant’s proposed activity).
28
But see John T. Walsh & Thomas P. Redick, Managing Agricultural Risks in Biopharming: The Role of
Injunctions, 7 ABA AGRIC. MGMT. COM. NEWSL. 15, 15 (2003) (“the fact of future predictable losses of
the same character, clearly create sufficient factual precedent for a threat of “irreparable harm” to merit an
injunction against similar crops prior to sale”).
29
See Carie-Megan Flood, Note, Pollen Drift and Potential Causes of Action, 28 J. CORP. L. 473, 477-82
(2003) (recommending the trespass liability theory as suitable for claims by an individual plaintiff farmer
and strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities as more appropriate where the damage extended
beyond the individual farmer to the mass population).
30
MOELLER, supra note 19, at 4; Endres, supra note 26, at 488-91 (analyzing strict liability cases in similar
contexts).
31
Cox, supra note 3, at 410-11.
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Ultimately, tort-based liability of seed manufacturers and GM farmers to
consumers, environmental organizations, trade associations, and the government may
arise for harm to human health and the environment.32 Consumer claims for injuries may
also arise in the future from the failure to warn of the presence of genetically engineered
components.33 In view of the scientific uncertainty and potential for harm, the
possibilities of major catastrophic incidents and future health claims are infinite. From a
risk assessment point of view, biotech companies should have cause for concern.

III. RECENT INCIDENTS AND LAWSUITS SEEKING REDRESS
The logical gap between ownership and liability has long been illustrated by
the pollen-drift cases, where farmers have been aggressively sued under the patent
infringement laws by Monsanto for the unintentional seed drift into their fields.34 The
biotech company has notoriously prevailed despite the fact the farmers did not intend
to use the genetically modified seed and might have suffered economic loss from the
contamination, particularly if the farm was organic.35 Commentators have argued that
such a scenario could more appropriately be viewed as contamination and warrant a
countersuit by the farmer.36 As a matter of public policy, shifting legal liability onto
the companies in the best position in terms of knowledge and control would provide
the economic incentive for them to take adequate measures to prevent such pollen
drift in the future.37 Recent developments in case law suggest that such a shift has
begun to take hold. Moreover, the voices of suppliers and trade associations have
begun to impact these practices, along with the predominance of concerns for
international trade. Yet the question remains whether the voice of consumers and
non-GM farmers will, as a consequence, be heard through future U.S. legislation.

32

See generally Tana N. Vollendorf, Comment, Genetically Modified Organisms: Someone is in the
Kitchen with DNA—Who is Responsible When Someone Gets Burned?, 21 MISS. C.L. REV. 43 (2001).
See generally Katherine Van Tassel, The Introduction of Biotech Food to the Tort System: Creating a
New Duty to Identify, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1645 (2004).
34
See Strauss, International Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 13, at 298. The case of Percy
Schmeiser, a Canadian farmer aggressively pursued by Monsanto for patent infringement despite his lack
of intention and the fact that his own long developed crop of corn was mutated by the Monsanto seed, is
one of many dramatic examples. Id. at 295-97.
35
Id. at 297 (theorizing that the inequity of resources has prevented farmers from pursuing their legal rights
in this area).
36
See, e.g., Strauss, International Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 13, at 299; Margaret R.
Grossman, Biotechnology, Property Rights and the Environment, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 215, 247 (2002)
(discussing common-law tort actions as a remedy to the general public and to property owners who have
suffered economic losses from cross-pollution and commingling, “especially when growers plant GM
crops not approved for all uses and by important trading partners”).
37
Strauss, International Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 13, at 297; see also Tim Van Pelt,
Is Changing Patent Infringement Liability the Appropriate Mechanism for Allocating the Cost of Pollen
Drift?, 31 IOWA J. CORP. L. 567, 577–78 (2006) (arguing that, because the pollen drift generates costs for
the farmers who want to avoid passive infringement or who want to preserve genetic purity in their crops,
the patent holder should be forced to internalize the costs related to the spread of its own patented genes).
33
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The Farmers Strike Back: LibertyLink® Rice

Most significantly, the theory of liability for contamination has now been
successfully applied by the courts in the landmark LibertyLink® rice lawsuits on
behalf of farmers whose fields have been contaminated with unwanted GMOs due to
outcrossing and migration, imposing multimillion dollar jury verdicts on the biotech
company Bayer CropScience for its negligence in recklessly allowing this spread and
the resulting harm to the U.S. long-grain rice crop.
LibertyLink® rice (LL 601), a variety of genetically modified rice from the
United States that was in an experimental trial phase and not approved for human
consumption, was found on supermarket shelves in the EU.38 The experimental rice
was genetically modified to withstand higher doses of the Liberty® weed killer
glufosinate, itself a controversial pesticide that may soon be banned from Europe as
toxic.39 Trace amounts of the LibertyLink® rice had somehow entered the commercial
rice supply in all five of the Southern states that grow long-grain rice: Arkansas,
Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Missouri. By the time Bayer informed the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA), which announced the contamination in August
2006, the unapproved rice had crossed into food products.40 As a result, Japan and the
European Union (EU) placed strict limits on U.S. rice imports, with European nations
requiring extensive testing to show lack of contamination and Japan banning
American rice altogether; U.S. rice prices dropped dramatically. Within four days of
the announcement, a decline in rice futures reportedly had cost U.S. growers about
$150 million and by September, rice prices had declined 10 percent.41
In a highly unusual move, the USDA hastily “deregulated” the genetically
modified rice retroactively, despite the fact that the vast majority of the comments it
received on its proposed decision in September opposed the nonregulated status.42
38
See
Physorg.com,
GM
Rice
from
U.S.
found
in
EU,
Sept.
13,
2006,
http://www.physorg.com/news77388811.html (genetically modified rice from the United States discovered
in the EU, in violation of a ban on import, growth and sale of such crops.).
39
Canadian Biotechnology Action Network (CBAN), Hands off Our Rice. Protect the World’s Most
Important Food From Genetic Engineering, April 15, 2009, HEALTH ACTION NETWORK SOCIETY (HANS),
https://www.hans.org/magazine/488/engineering-important-genetic-protect.

We ask all governments around the world to protect consumers and farmers, their
crops and fields by rejecting Bayer’s GE rice, and to stop GE rice field trials . . .
Rice is daily food for half of the world’s population. Genetically engineered (GE)
rice, on the other hand, is a threat to our health, our agriculture and our biodiversity.
Id.
Marc Gunther, Attack of the Mutant Rice, FORTUNE, July 9, 2007, at 74, 76.
Rick Weiss, Gene-altered Profit-killer: A Slight Taint of Biotech Rice Puts Farmers’ Overseas Sales in
Peril, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2006, at D01; see also U.S. Rice Producers Association, Secretary Johanns:
“Give Our Farmers Good Access to World Markets…,” THE RICE ADVOCATE, July 8, 2005, at 1.
42
The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture cleared
the LLRICE601 (LibertyLink®) strain for human use on November 24, 2006 (71 Fed. Reg. 70360-70372).
The published notice of its preliminary decision in September had prompted 15,871 comments, of which
15,517 opposed this nonregulated status. See Regulatory Affairs—Agricultural and Environmental:
Lawsuits over Liberty Link Rice Consolidated, 26 BIOTECH L. REP. 20 (2007); see also Rachel Iadicicco &

40

41
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Its investigation into the how the LibertyLink® rice entered the nation’s long-grain
rice supply—an inquiry it considered to be independent of the approval process—
remains inconclusive.43 This withdrawal of U.S. government oversight further
exacerbated the international trade issue.44 Roughly half of the U.S. rice crop, which
was worth about $1.9 billion the previous year, is exported; and European and Asian
markets have erected barriers that reflect their consumers’ rejection of genetically
modified foods.45
A class-action lawsuit was filed on May 17, 2007 by rice farmers in
Arkansas, Missouri, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas against Bayer CropScience,
alleging its genetically modified rice contaminated the crop and caused severe
economic loss.46 In the Complaint, the rice producers assert, among other claims,
public nuisance, private nuisance, negligence per se (based on violations of federal
and state statutory law), negligence, strict liability for ultrahazardous activities and
Jerry Redding, Press Release, USDA: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), USDA
Deregulates Line of Genetically Engineered Rice, Nov. 24, 2006, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/
newsroom/content/2006/11/rice_deregulate.shtml. The USDA press release noted that: “[d]eregulated
items and their progeny are considered safe for the environment and can be grown without APHIS
oversight.” Id.
43
See USDA APHIS, Report: “Report of LibertyLink Rice Incidents,” Oct. 5, 2007,
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/content/2007/10/content/printable/RiceReport10-2007.pdf; USDA
APHIS
Lessons
Learned:
“APHIS’
Biotechnology
Framework,”
Oct.
5,
2007,
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/content/2007/10/content/
printable/LessonsLearned10-2007.pdf;
FDA, CFSAN/Office of Food Additive Safety, “U.S. Food and Drug Administration's Statement on Report
of Bioengineered Rice in the Food Supply,” Aug. 2006, http://www.fda.gov/Food/Biotechnology/
Announcements/ucm109411.htm.
This rice variety, not intended for commercialization, was not submitted to FDA for
evaluation under the Agency's voluntary biotechnology consultation process . . .
Based on the available data and information, FDA has concluded that the presence
of this bioengineered rice variety in the food and feed supply poses no food or feed
safety concerns.
Id.
44
Gunther, supra note 40, at 77; Christopher Lee, Genetically Engineered Rice Wins USDA Approval,
WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/24/
AR2006112401153.html (“In approving the rice, the USDA allowed Bayer to take a regulatory shortcut
and skip many of the usual safety tests by declaring that the new variety is similar to ones already
approved, in this case two varieties of biotech rice that Bayer never commercialized because farmers did
not want them in their fields.”); Jessica Fraser, USDA Approves Genetically Engineered Rice that
Contaminated U.S. Food Supply; Safety Tests Skipped, NEWS TARGET, Nov. 29, 2006,
http://www.naturalnews.com/021203.html.
45
Gunther, supra note 40, at 77. For more on issues of international trade involving GM foods, see Debra
M. Strauss, Feast or Famine: The Impact of the WTO Decision Favoring the U.S. Biotechnology Industry
in the EU Ban of GM Foods, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 775 (2008) (characterizing the EC-Biotech dispute as a
disruption in trade between the United States and EU caused by their different regulatory approaches
toward GMOs, which are in turn a reflection of the differing views and levels of concern about genetically
modified food in the face of scientific uncertainty) [hereinafter Strauss, Impact of the WTO].
46
In Re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, 06-md-1811, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of
Missouri.
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strict product liability. They are seeking relief on their own behalf and on behalf of
the other members of the proposed classes for compensatory and consequential
damages, punitive or exemplary damages, and injunctive relief arising from the
defendants’ allegedly wrongful conduct. In August 2008, the judge overseeing the
multidistrict litigation declined to certify it as a class action because in her view the
mitigating responses of each farmer made their damage claims too different, such that
“[i]ndividual circumstances affecting the calculation of individual plaintiffs’ damages
predominate over the common issues presented in plaintiffs’ claims.” 47 This ruling
set in motion the potential for thousands of individual trials, scheduled as “test cases”
on typical claims. Currently federal district judge Catherine Perry in St. Louis is
overseeing approximately 3,000 lawsuits by rice farmers alleging that Bayer
CropScience was careless in handling its experimental, genetically modified strain of
long-grain rice, allowing it to contaminate the national crop.48
Since then, the individual jury verdicts in trials against Bayer have been
mounting. In the first of the “bellwether trials,” a St. Louis jury found Bayer
CropScience and several of its affiliates negligent and awarded over $2 million in
compensatory damages to two Missouri long-grain rice farmers, Ken Bell and John
Hunter, for the economic loss they suffered due to the drop in U.S. rice prices and
much lower demand for their rice since 2006 that resulted from the contamination
of their crops.49 The second trial awarded a total of $1.5 million to two Arkansas
47
In Re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, 251 F.R.D. 392, 400 (E.D. Mo. 2008). Without addressing
the merits of their claims, Judge Perry observed that:

Some plaintiffs allege that as a result of this ban, they were forced to plant alternate,
lower-yield seed varieties, thereby reducing the size of their harvests. Other
plaintiffs allege that they were unable to obtain any rice seed because of the ban, and
had to plant different crops altogether. Plaintiffs who produced rice during the 2007
crop year incurred added costs in testing and segregating their rice to make sure it
was free of genetically-modified traits. Land, equipment, and storage facilities were
also contaminated and had to be cleaned to prevent further contamination.
Id. at 394.
Alison Frankel, In Bellwether Trial in Billion-Dollar MDL, Bayer Found Liable for Crop
Contamination, Dec. 7, 2009, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, http://www.law.com. See, e.g., In Re Genetically
Modified Rice Litigation, 2010 WL 2326036 (E.D. Mo. June 7, 2010) (pre-trial rulings granting
defendants’ motions for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims under the North Carolina Unfair Trade
Practices Act and plaintiffs’ claims for negligence per se and for public and private nuisance; and granting
plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment directed to certain affirmative defenses, determining as a matter
of law that the regulations under the Plant Protection Act do not allow for low level or adventitious
presence of regulated genetically modified rice in the commercial rice supply and declining to allow expert
witness testimony to the contrary). For more information on the status of these lawsuits, see GM Rice
Litigation, http://www.bayerrice litigation.com/Press.htm.
49
Press Release, Two Missouri Rice Farmers Awarded $2 Million in First Lawsuit Heard Against GermanBased Bayer CropScience AG, Dec. 4, 2009, http://www.bayerricelitigation.com/PDFs/Press%20
Release/bayer%20press%20release%201.pdf?action=view&id=70; see also Andrew M. Harris & Joe
Whittington, $2 Million Verdict Against Bayer CropScience, ST. LOUIS POST, Dec. 5, 2009, available at
http://www.stltoday.com. See In Re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, 2010 WL 2926207, at *1 (E.D.
Mo. July 20, 2010) (denying defendants’ motion for a new trial and defendants’ other post-trial motions
48
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long-grain rice farmers and one in Mississippi whose crops and livelihood were
similarly harmed by the genetically modified rice. The plaintiffs’ attorney, Don
Downing, commented, “A second consecutive verdict against Bayer should send a
clear and strong message to the company about its negligent conduct and the damages
that conduct actually caused to American rice farmers, not only in this case but in the
other matters that are scheduled for trial.”50 The award calculations were “based on
the number of acres each farmer planted and the impact of the contamination on their
land.”51 Two state court losses followed in Arkansas, the first for about $1 million,
including $500,000 in punitive damages. In the previous three cases, Bayer faced
$4.5 million of judgments. The jury verdict for the fourth trial (the second state court
loss) exceeded the prior judgments by both monetary amount and type, adding
significant punitive damages against the biotech company of $42 million along with
compensatory damages of $5.9 million.52 The dozen Arkansas farmers argued that, in
addition to being negligent in its handling of the genetically modified rice, Bayer
acted with malicious intent by not announcing the contamination of the commercial
rice-seed pool when Bayer discovered it before the crops were sowed.53 A fifth jury
recently awarded damages of $500,248 to a Louisiana farmer who claimed that the
company was negligent in testing its genetically modified seed, causing a plunge in
exports to Europe.54 As Don Downing observed:
Five different juries under the laws of four different states in both federal and
state courts now have unanimously found that Bayer was negligent and liable to rice
farmers for damages. Not a single juror in any of the five trials found for Bayer.55
These trials represent the first step Judge Perry of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri ordered in the multidistrict litigation involving more
than 6,000 rice producers in the five states. Bayer faces approximately 500 additional
lawsuits in federal and state courts. As the cases continue through the summer of
2010 with a sixth case on trial in Arkansas state court followed by a federal trial in
St. Louis in October, a major settlement becomes increasingly likely.56 In the case of
including renewed motion for summary judgment that was previously denied).
50
Press Release, Second Bayer ‘Bellwether’ Trial Results in Another Verdict for Plaintiffs: $1.5 Million
Award to Rice Farmers in Arkansas Mississippi, Feb. 5, 2010, http://www.bayerricelitigation.com/PDFs
/Press%20Release/bayer%20press%20release%202.pdf?newsid=117843&type_news=latest. See In Re
Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, 2010 WL 2926214, at *4 (E.D. Mo. July 20, 2010) (denying
defendants’ post-trial motions).
51
Id.
52
Associated Press, Jury Tells Bayer to Pay Ark. Rice Farmers $48M, April 15, 2010,
http://www.bayerricelitigation.com/PDFs/SKELLY67_1271429373912.pdf.
53
Id.
54
Margaret Cronin Fisk & Joe Whittington, Bayer Loses Fifth Straight Trial Over U.S. Rice Crops, July 15,
2010, http://greenbio.checkbiotech.org/news/ bayer_loses_fifth_straight_trial_over_us_rice_crops.
55
Id.
56
Plaintiffs’ attorney Downing emphasized that they will continue to push these cases to trial “until Bayer
decides it is willing to provide fair compensation through settlement”; and mediation discussions are ongoing
in the federal lawsuits in St. Louis. A CropScience spokesman, Greg Coffey, said the company is “hopeful
that all parties might approach resolution in a positive and reasonable manner.” Id. See also Christopher Tritto,
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genetically modified rice, this litigation can be expected soon to reach a critical mass
reminiscent of the tobacco litigation as previously predicted.57 Will there be a similar
massive settlement and an accompanying shift in assumptions on the horizon?
It is significant to note that there are no claims in the rice litigation that
LibertyLink® harmed or risked human health. Rather, the farmers claim that the
contamination of the commercial rice crop caused them economic loss in the
European market for long-grain rice in sales that have not rebounded.58 If such claims
are filed in the future on behalf of consumers for these or other genetically modified
crops, one can only imagine the magnitude of the liability that would be faced by the
biotech companies and possibly the farmers who planted these crops.
B.

The Foundation is Set: StarLink® Corn, Canada Canola, GM Alfalfa,
ProdiGene, and Others

This is not the first time such a suit has been filed in the United States due
to outcrossing contamination. In 2004, the nation’s corn farmers received more than
$100 million from the settlement of a case in which a genetically engineered variety
of corn known as StarLink®, which had been approved only for animal feed, was
found in taco shells and corn chips, among other products. StarLink®, a corn
genetically engineered with a Cry9C protein to protect crops against certain insects,
was considered suitable only for animal feed because of concerns that it could cause
allergic reactions in humans; but StarLink® accidentally entered the food supply,
prompting a large scale recall of about 300 corn products.59 Although it had been
planted in less than one percent of U.S. corn acreage, StarLink® was found in
22 percent of the corn samples tested by the USDA.60 After an extensive program to
remove it, three years later StarLink® was still detected in more than one percent of
corn samples.61 The testing/screening program was discontinued in 2008.62
Rice Man Cometh: Don Downing v. Bayer, ST. LOUIS BUS. J., July 23, 2010, available at
http://stlouis.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/2010/07/26/story2.html?b=1280116800^3694491
&s=industry&i=legal.
57
See Strauss, International Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 13, at 299 (“This new approach by the
farmers—a class action so widespread that it represents the industry as a whole—if successful, may be the
beginning of a turning tide, as was seen in the tobacco litigation.”)
58
Id.
59
See Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 173-74; Martin A. Lee, Food Fight: International Protests
Mount Against Genetically Engineered Crops, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN, June 25, 2001, available at
http://www.commondreams.org/ views01/0628-01.htm (“While acknowledging that nearly a half billion
bushels of corn in storage nationwide contain StarLink, Aventis denies that it poses a health risk to humans.”).
60
Smith, Myth, supra note 8.
61
Id.
62
StarLink Information Center, “FDA Withdraws STARLINK Corn Testing Guidance,” April 25, 2008,
http://www.starlinkcorn.com/ (last visited July 25, 2010) (stating that the FDA later withdrew its requirement
of testing/screening the U.S. corn supply to minimize the production of human food products with corn
containing the Cry9C protein, based on an EPA White Paper that “conclude[d] that the protein has been
sufficiently removed from the human food supply to render the level of risk low enough that continued testing
for the protein in yellow corn at dry mills and mass production facilities provides no added public health
protection.”); FDA, Guidance for Industry on the Food and Drug Administration Recommendations for
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In addition, the cross-contamination had an impact on international trade,
causing a drop in Japanese imports of U.S. corn by 1.3 million metric tons (8 percent
in volume terms) in 2001.63 The Japanese government now mandates the segregation
of unapproved biotechnology food and feed ingredients from the export channel, with
a zero tolerance for unapproved GM varieties that are found in foods.64
As a result of the StarLink® corn contamination, consumers and farmers in
class action lawsuits sued the biotech manufacturer, Aventis, under several theories of
liability, including negligence, strict liability, and nuisance.65 This incident has been
scrutinized as a lesson that “if a company makes a mistake in commercializing a
transgenic crop, the cost of civil liability for food biotechnology can be very high.”66 In
this case, the company shouldered the cost of recalling the product and destroying the
remaining seed inventory, detecting and eliminating any residual StarLink® in the U.S.
corn supply, and settling class actions with consumers who allegedly suffered allergic
reactions (despite the fact that no such reactions were proven) for nine million dollars
and corn growers who allegedly suffered depressed corn prices as a result for another
$110 million.67 Aventis ultimately sold its crop science unit to Bayer, the same division
that is now facing the consequences of its second contamination debacle with
LibertyLink® rice.68
Most significantly in terms of liability, the StarLink® cases confirmed that
“negligence, negligence per se, strict liability in tort, trespass, private nuisance, public
nuisance, and others are all theories under which the company which markets a product
might be liable for damage that would result.”69 Although the lawsuits were settled and
there was no decision on the merits of the case, these bases for legal liability for crop
contamination did survive a motion to dismiss.70 In addition, the foundation was
established for a new concept of economic loss—that the contamination of the crop
caused a depressing effect on the prices of an entire crop market, and every farmer who
sold any corn that year was in fact damaged because of depressed prices—a notion that
could also apply when a genetically engineered crop is fully approved in the U.S. but is
Sampling and Testing Yellow Corn and Dry-Milled Yellow Corn Shipments Intended for Human Food Use
for Cry9C Protein Residues; Withdrawal of Guidance, 73 Fed. Reg. 22716 (April 25, 2008).
63
James Stamps, Trade in Biotechnology Food Products, INT’L ECON. REV. 5, 13-14 (2002).
64
Id. at 14; see also CropChoice News, Japan Shuns Corn over GE Issue, Organic Consumers
Association, Apr. 9, 2001, available at http://www.purefood.org/gefood/japanshuns.cfm. See The Organic
and Non-GMO Report, Japan’s legislation on labeling of genetically engineered foods, http://www.nongmoreport.com/Japan_legislation_labeling_GM_foods.php (last visited Aug. 1, 2010).
65
In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2002); see Cox,
supra note 3, at 411.
66
Donald Uchtmann, Liability Issues: Lessons from StarLink, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 23 (2004).
67
Id.
68
Gunther, supra note 40, at 76.
69
Uchtmann, supra note 66, at 23.
70
Id.; Grossman, supra note 27, at 120-21 (analyzing judge’s treatment of private and public nuisance
claims in allowing StarLink litigation to proceed on these theories); Starlink, 212 F. Supp 2d at 848. But
see Cox, supra note 3, at 412 (viewing this question of legal liability as open because there was no decision
on the merits of this case).
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not approved in major export markets.71 This economic loss doctrine is now being
successfully tested in the LibertyLink® rice litigation.
Similarly, in Canada, two certified organic farmers brought a class action
against Monsanto Canada and Aventis (later amended to be Bayer CropScience) in
2002 for damages resulting from the widespread contamination of their crops by GM
canola and for an injunction to prevent the commercial introduction of GM wheat.72
The genetically herbicide-resistant canola inexplicably appeared to have spread to a
wild relative.73 The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of losing their organic
certification and their ability to grow and market organic canola after Monsanto’s
Roundup Ready® canola and Bayer’s Liberty Link® canola had been found growing
on their land, “few, if any, certified organic grain farmers are now growing canola.
The crop, as an important tool in the crop rotations of organic farmers, and as an
organic grain commodity, has been lost to certified organic farmers in
Saskatchewan.”74 They based their liability claims on the tort theories of: negligence,
for the seed companies’ breaching their duty “to ensure that their GM canola would
not infiltrate and contaminate farmland . . . to warn growers about cross-pollination
and . . . to advise growers of farming practices that would limit the spread of their
GM canola”; nuisance that “interfered with certified organic grain farmers’ use and
enjoyment of their land”; strict liability for “having engaged in a non-natural use of
land, and allowing the escape of something likely to do mischief and damage”; and
trespass for the “introduction of GM canola and its unconfined release” into the
environment.75 However, in that case the judge denied the motion for class
certification and indicated doubt as to the viability of some of these claims. She found
that, although some farmers may have been hurt, there was no evidence that organic
farmers as a class have suffered because some of them were able to find markets for
their canola; moreover, there lacked a plausible legal basis for imposing liability on
the defendant on the grounds of negligence (for want of duty of care), nuisance, and
trespass.76
Unfortunately, other examples are becoming increasingly abundant,
producing mounting evidence of safety breaches that may soon surpass mere
negligence. In the summer of 2006, creeping bentgrass under development by the
71

Uchtmann, supra note 66, at 23.
Hoffman and Beaudoin v. Monsanto Canada, Sask. Q.B., No. 67 of 2002, http://www.saskorganic.com
/oapf/pdf/amended-claim.pdf.
73
Martin Philipson, Agricultural Law: Containing the GM Revolution, 48 BIOTECHNOLOGY & DEV.
MONITOR 2 (Dec. 2001), cited in Rachel Durkee Walker & Jill Doerfler, Wild Rice: The Minnesota
Legislature, a Distinctive Crop, GMOs, and OJIBWE Perspectives, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 499, 519 (2009)
(statement to Missouri legislature citing examples of the dangers of GMOs).
74
Statement of Claim in the Court of Queen's Bench, http:// www.saskorganic.com/oapf/pdf/stmt-ofclaim.pdf (Jan. 10, 2002).
75
Id.; see also Jane Matthews Glenn, Footloose: Civil Responsibility for GMO Gene Wandering in
Canada, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 547, 551 (2004).
76
Lara Khoury & Stuart Smyth, Reasonable Foreseeability and Liability in Relation to Genetically Modified
Organisms, 27 BUL. SCI. TECH. & SOC. 215, 221 (2007). See generally Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, Hoffman v.
Monsanto: Courts, Class Actions, and the Perceptions of the Problem of GM Drift, 27 BUL. SCI. TECH. & SOC.
188 (2007).
72
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Scotts Miracle-Gro Company and Monsanto was discovered to have escaped into the
wild from Oregon test sites that had been used a few years earlier.77 The genetically
engineered grass (GTCB), intended for use on golf courses and not yet approved by
the USDA, contained a bacterial gene that made it resistant to the herbicide
glyphosate, sold commercially as Roundup®. Apparently the wind had dispersed the
seeds and the pollen had crossed with other varieties. Scientists have expressed
concern that the variety will cross pollinate with other grass varieties and may
contaminate the commercial grass seed supply—70 percent of which is grown in
Oregon.78 Another risk is the creation of “superweeds,” making the weedy grasses
harder to control with glyphosate, a widely used herbicide and leading to more toxic
herbicides.79 In the litigation that ensued, the plaintiffs alleged that by permitting the
field tests, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) had violated the
Plant Protection Act (PPA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).80 They claimed that APHIS had failed
to consider whether this crop is a plant pest under the PPA, evaluate the
environmental impact under NEPA, and follow its own regulations. The court held
that the denial of plaintiffs’ petition to list GTCB as a noxious weed was arbitrary and
capricious, as was its failure to require an environmental impact assessment.81
In another case in Hawaii, a federal judge in August 2006 ruled that the
drug-producing GM crops grown in Hawaii violated both the Endangered Species
Act (ESA) and NEPA.82 Several companies had run field tests from 2001 to 2003 of
corn and sugarcane genetically engineered to produce experimental vaccines,
hormones, and cancer-fighting agents. In view of concerns for Hawaii’s fragile
ecosystem, the court held that APHIS had violated ESA because it had failed to
obtain information about endangered and threatened species in the area of the permits
and NEPA for failing to prepare an environmental assessment or impact statement.83
77
Andrew Pollack, Grass Created in Lab is Found in the Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2006, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/16/science/16grass.html, cited in Walker & Doerfler, supra note 73,
at 518 (as evidence that the regulators are not regulating) [hereinafter Pollack, Grass].
78
Smith, Whistleblower, supra note 16.
79
Pollack, Grass, supra note 77; see also William Neuman & Andrew Pollack, Farmers Cope with
Roundup-Resistant Weeds, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/
business/energy-environment/04weed.html? ref=food_prices (Roundup-resistant weeds like horseweed and
giant ragweed are forcing farmers to spray fields with more toxic herbicides and to use more expensive
techniques previously abandoned— more labor-intensive methods like pulling weeds and regular
plowing.). The National Research Council has also issued its own warning about the emergence of resistant
weeds and other risks as limiting the potential benefits of GM crops. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
IMPACT OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS ON FARM SUSTAINABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (April 13,
2010), available at http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes/ genengcrops.pdf.
80
International Center for Technology Assessment v. Johanns, 473 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12-13 (D.D.C. 2007).
The Scotts Company intervened in the case as a defendant. See Grossman, supra note 27, at 147-149
(discussing this case and others as illustrating the type of environmental damage feared from GM crops).
81
473 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30; Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7758; Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706; National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f.
82
Center for Food Safety v. Johanns, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1182-83 (D. Haw. 2006).
83
451 F. Supp. 2d at 1183. See Grossman, supra note 27, at 149-51.
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However, by the time this court decision took place, the field tests had already been
completed and the potential damage done. As further evidence of this type of harm,
in September 2004 citizen groups revealed that tests of nearly 20,000 papaya seeds
on the Big Island of Hawaii determined that half were genetically modified; to make
matters worse, 80 percent were from organic farms, while 20 percent were from
home gardens and wild papaya trees.84 Likewise in Japan, although transgenic canola
is not grown commercially there, it was discovered growing near some ports and
roadsides; scientists theorized that imported seeds had escaped during transportation
to oil-processing facilities.85
Additional controversies have occurred in California, where in two separate
federal lawsuits plaintiffs, consisting of farmers, the Sierra Club, and other consumer
organizations, successfully challenged the USDA’s decision to deregulate
Monsanto’s glyphosate-resistant sugar beets and alfalfa despite considerable
questions about potential environmental degradation and without an environmental
impact statement (EIS).86 In the GM sugar beet case, the District Judge ruled in
September 2009 that the USDA failed to adequately assess the environmental impact
of Monsanto’s Roundup Ready® sugar beets before introducing them into the food
supply, but in a later decision denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.87
In the GM alfalfa case, in 2008 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit upheld the District Court’s 2007 decision issuing an injunction and ordering
an EIS.88 However, on June 21, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 7 to 1 in favor of
Monsanto, stating in its opinion that the District Court had abused its discretion in
granting an injunction prohibiting partial deregulation of the Roundup Ready® alfalfa.
APHIS must still complete the EIS, but can decide to partially deregulate the alfalfa,
allowing it to be planted before the EIS is finished.89 As the Supreme Court’s “firstever ruling on genetically modified crops,” this decision was viewed as “a victory for
Monsanto and others in the agricultural biotechnology industry, with potential

84

Smith, Myth, supra note 8, at 1.
Pollack, Grass, supra note 77, cited in Walker & Doerfler, supra note 73 (as example of danger of
allowing field testing of genetically modified crops).
86
Center for Food Safety et al. v. Vilsack, 2009 WL 3047227 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2009) (APHIS required to
prepare EIS for GM sugar beets); Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 2007 WL 518624 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007)
(issuing injunction against planting GM alfalfa). See Grossman, supra note 27, at 151-53 (discussing alfalfa
case).
87
See Caroline Scott-Thomas, Judge rules against Monsanto’s GM sugar beets, Food navigator-usa.com, Sept.
23, 2009; Environmental News Network, Battle lines drawn over GM sugar beets, March 6, 2008, available at
http://www.enn.com/ agriculture/article/32414. But see Center for Food Safety et al. v. Schafer, 2010 WL
964017, *4-5 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (denial of injunction in Roundup Ready® sugar beet litigation). In weighing the
equities of the parties and denying the injunction, the court did express serious reservations: “In light of
Plaintiffs’ showing of irreparable harm to the environment, the Court is troubled by maintaining the status quo
that consists of ninety-five percent of sugar beets being genetically engineered while APHIS conducts the
environmental review that should have occurred before the sugar beets were deregulated.” Id. at *5.
88
Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 541 F.3d 938, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding permanent injunction
against use of Roundup Ready® alfalfa).
89
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2761 (2010).
85
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implications for other cases.”90 Yet this impact may be overstated, as the ruling was
by its terms narrow and limited.91 The Supreme Court did not go so far as to approve
the GM alfalfa or address safety concerns; at most, it shifted some regulatory
responsibility away from the courts and back on the regulatory agencies charged in
the first instance with these oversight responsibilities.
In another incident back in 2002, an experimental crop of corn engineered by
ProdiGene to produce pharmaceuticals began sprouting in soybean fields designated for
human and animal consumption near the company’s Nebraska and Iowa sites.92 The
USDA seized 500,000 bushels of tainted soybeans before they reached the market and
charged ProdiGene nearly $3 million in fines and disposal costs. The culprit in that
contamination was not only pollen drift but the commingling of plants from improper
handling, prompting APHIS to propose tightening guidelines for field testing plantmade pharmaceuticals (PMPs) to mandate that no food crops could be grown in the
same field in the following planting season and that experimental PMPs be grown
further away from conventional crops, as well as the use of segregated equipment and
cleaning protocols.93 Even conventional food and grain producers and the National
Corn Growers Association call for more stringent requirements.94 As these events have
demonstrated, potential liability is not merely theoretical; as a consequence, “[u]nless
90
See Andrew Pollack, Justices Back Monsanto on Biotech Seed Planting, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2010,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/business/22bizcourt.html?scp=1&sq=Justices+Back+
Monsanto+on+Biotech+Seed+Planting&st=nyt; see also American Soybean Association (ASA),
Ag-Regulatory Approvals Backgrounder, http://www.soygrowers.com/issues/ag-related_regulatory_
approvals.htm (“This ruling has had the positive effect of returning the decision on how applications for
new biotech traits will be handled to APHIS, rather than the courts.”).
91
See Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2747.

Because petitioners and the Government do not argue otherwise, the Court assumes
without deciding that the District Court acted lawfully in vacating the agency’s
decision to completely deregulate RRA. The Court therefore addresses only the
injunction prohibiting APHIS from deregulating RRA pending completion of the EIS,
and the nationwide injunction prohibiting almost all RRA planting during the pendency
of the EIS process.
Id.
Arlene Weintraub, What’s So Scary About Rice? Biotech Crops Can Make Drugs—But They Must Be Kept Out
of the Food Chain, BUS. WK., Aug. 1, 2005, at 58; see also The Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology,
Pharming Reaps Regulatory Changes, May 15, 2003, available at http://lists.iatp.org/listarchive/archive.
cfm?id=74423 (finding that seeds inadvertently left behind in former test sites mingled with soybeans that were
harvested and stored before the situation was discovered). Two months earlier, Prodigene had to destroy 155 acres
of corn in Iowa due to contamination suspected from the wind-blown pollen of its drug-producing plants. See
Karen Perry Stillerman, Pharmaceutical Food Crops in a Field Near You, Union of Concerned Scientists,
http://www.ucsusa.org/food_and_agriculture/science_and_impacts/impacts_genetic_engineering/pcc-article.html.
93
See John S. Harbison, The War on GMOs: A Report from the Front, National AgLaw Center, Aug. 2004,
at 2-3, http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/ assets/articles/harbison_gmos.pdf; Field Testing of Plants
Engineered to Produce Pharmaceutical and Industrial Compounds, 68 Fed. Reg. 11337-01 (proposed March 10,
2003) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. Part 340); Environmental Impact Statement; Introduction of Genetically
Engineered Organisms, 69 Fed. Reg. 3271-01 (proposed January 23, 2004) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. Part 340).
94
Harbison, supra note 93, at 3.
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companies and the agencies that regulate them implement safeguards to prevent these
food-safety fears from becoming a reality, this biotech method of drug production faces
an unsteady future.”95
C.

The Suppliers Demand: Ventria Rice, Anheuser-Busch, and the Role of
Trade Associations

In the marketplace rules of biotechnology, suppliers can have a significant
impact. In large measure they have been sensitive to consumer preference and steered
clear of GM crops, clearly making these demands known to the farmers and biotech
companies. An example came recently in the context of GM drug-producing rice and
beer. When a small biotechnology company, Ventria Biosciences, revealed its plans to
insert human genes into rice plants to produce two proteins normally found in breast
milk, tears, and saliva, to create “therapeutic food products to treat stomach disorders,”
Anheuser-Busch threatened to boycott all Missouri rice. The company feared
contamination of the rice plants that are a key ingredient in its beer.96 Although the
state of Missouri listened and Anheuser-Busch succeeded in protecting its supply of
rice plants there, while California similarly sustained its farmers’ objections, Ventria
simply moved to a less resistant locale; in May 2005, USDA approved Ventria’s
application for pharma rice plants on up to 3,200 acres in Kansas instead.97
Because using this GM method to produce drugs in mass quantities of field
plantings is less costly than a traditional biotechnology factory, several other
biotechnology companies are experimenting with variations of drug-producing
plants.98 A consulting firm forecasts that plant-manufactured drugs will expand into a
$2.2 billion-per-year industry by 2011.99
Experts warn that pollen from GM drug plants could drift into fields
containing food crops and create contaminated hybrids; or a bird could ingest the
bioengineered seeds and deposit them in a field hundreds of miles away.100 Along
with risks to the consumer and the environment come significant potential
95
Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 174; see also Weintraub, supra note 92, at 58-59; Union of
Concerned Scientists, How Does Seed Contamination Occur, Dec. 15 2004, http://www.ucsusa.org/ food_
and_agriculture/science_and_impacts/impacts_genetic_engineering/how-does-seed-contamination.html.
96
Weintraub, supra note 92, at 58.
97
The USDA granted Ventria’s application over the objections conveyed in 20,000 comments from
citizens, activist, farmers, and rice industry groups. Gunther, supra note 40, at 78, 80.
98
Weintraub, supra note 92, at 58. “A traditional biotech factory might cost Ventria … $125 million,” but
rice yields “the same output for $4 million.” Chief Executive Officer Scott Deeter says “he intends to pass
the savings to consumers.” Id.
99
Id.
100
Margaret Mellon, Director of the Food and Environment program for the Union of Concerned Scientists
in Washington, D.C. warns that it is “virtually certain this stuff will make it into food-grade rice.” Id.
“[W]hen you’re genetically engineering bioactive molecules—drugs—into crops and they’re growing
outdoors, you must be able to assure those [engineered traits] don’t move to food crops. Otherwise you’re
imposing health and environmental risks.” Online Extra: The Side Effects of Drugged Crops, BUS. WK.,
July 26, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/ magazine/content/ 05_31/b3945092mz018.htm. See Strauss,
Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 173-74.
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consequences for international trade, as $1.3 billion in annual U.S. rice sales to
foreign countries are at stake.101 As was seen in the above examples, if drugs migrate
into commodity crops, many of these countries, already wary of biotech crops, would
buy their agricultural products elsewhere.102
Opponents to these pharma crops include consumer and environmental
advocates, and many farmers, and farmer organizations such as the American Farm
Bureau and the National Farmers Union. Even others in industry have resisted the use of
biotech crops for drug production; the U.S. Rice Federation, an industry group, opposed
Ventria’s pharma rice, pointing to LibertyLink® and asserting that it does not believe the
USDA can protect “the environment and the public’s food and feed supply from
unwanted intrusions of genetically engineered materials.”103 The agency itself inspires
little confidence with its track record of environmental and food contamination from
escaped GMOs. In an internal audit of APHIS in 2005, the USDA’s inspector general
disclosed that the agency charged with regulating field trials had no knowledge of the
location of some field trials, did no independent testing of nearby crops, and failed to
require biotech firms to submit protocols.104 Citing multiple inadequacies, the report
observed: “In fact, at various stages of the field test process—from approval of
applications to inspection of fields—weaknesses in APHIS regulations and internal
management controls increase the risk that regulated genetically engineered organisms
(GEO) will inadvertently persist in the environment before they are deemed safe to grow
without regulation.”105 The audit concluded: “APHIS’ current regulations, policies, and
procedures do not go far enough to ensure the safe introduction of agricultural
biotechnology.”106 Moreover, a 2004 report by the National Research Council urged the
government to improve its management and supervision, but acknowledged that “there is
no way to guarantee that field trialed crops will not pollute the environment.”107
Allowing the industry to monitor itself is essentially a tort waiting to happen.
Thus, trade associations have become proactive in having their voices fill the
regulatory void. In addition to the U.S. Rice Federation, other examples include the
American Soybean Association, representing farmers who face potential nuisance
liability suits, which asked seed manufacturers not to sell unapproved varieties
101

Weintraub, supra note 92, at 58.
Id.; Online Extra, supra note 100; see also Debra M. Strauss, Genetically Modified Organisms in Food:
A Model of Labeling and Monitoring With Positive Implications for International Trade, 40 INT’L LAW.
95, 96 (2006) (analyzing the differing regulatory approaches of the United States and the EU as a reflection
of the cultural views of risk and scientific uncertainty with an impact on international trade)[hereinafter
Strauss, A Model of Labeling].
103
Gunther, supra note 40, at 78.
104
Office of Inspector General: Southwest Region, Audit Report, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service Controls Over Issuance of Genetically Engineered Organism Release Permits (2005), available at
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-08-TE.pdf.
105
Id. at i.
106
Id. at iv.
107
Smith, Whistleblower, supra note 16(citing Justin Gillis, Genetically Modified Organisms Not Easily
Contained; National Research Council Panel Urges More Work to Protect Against Contamination of Food
Supply, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2004).
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commercially and set minimum requirements for segregating unapproved GM
soybeans.108 “These steps have helped to avoid commingling of approved varieties with
GM varieties not acceptable to trading partners, particularly in the EU.”109 To minimize
impediments to trade, the National Corn Growers Association has also advised its
members to be aware of the approval status of the seed they select and to direct those
that are not approved by the EU into the domestic market not into export channels.110
In addition, in the case of Agrisure RW corn (MIR604, developed by Syngenta to be
resistant to rootworm), the North American Export Grain Association voiced opposition,
citing Syngenta’s “erosion of corporate responsibility to maintain major export markets
… [and] disregard of the single largest market for US corn, Japan.”111 The
Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), which has over 1100 members, launched its
own Product Launch Stewardship Policy in May 2007 in part to avoid trade disruptions
by targeting key markets that will accept GMOs.112 However, industry cannot be relied
on to self-police, as it must be remembered that their motivation comes from their own
financial interests (i.e., fear of lawsuits) and its priority of promoting these genetically
engineered products as long as they are profitable still remains.113
D.

The International Marketplace Rules

As evidenced in the above instances, concern for international trade fuels
the actions of farmers and trade organizations. It would be logical to expect, then, that
the strict regulatory approach of the international community should have an impact
on the domestic agenda. Although it has lifted its moratorium on the approval of GM
foods, the EU still maintains its stringent labeling and approval directives, which
make the introduction of GMOs a far slower process and necessitate segregating U.S.

108

See ASA, Policy Resolution on Biotechnology Approvals and Minimum Requirements for Attempted
Identity-Preserved Production, Harvesting, and Utilization of Biotechnology-enhanced Varieties/Hybrids
that are Unapproved for Export to Major Markets (2000), http://www.soygrowers.com/publications/
minrequire-IP.htm.
109
Grossman, supra note 27, at 166.
110
National Corn Growers Association, Know Before You Grow, http://www.ncga.com/know-you-grow
(last visited July 29, 2010) (“This is why NCGA works with technology providers to publicize regular
updates on the approval status of these events. Regardless of export status, there is an ample market for
U.S. biotech corn – approximately 42 percent of all U.S.-grown corn is fed to domestic livestock.”).
111
Gary C. Martin, North American Export Grain Association (NAEGA), Comment on Docket No APHIS2006-0157, at 2 (Mar. 12, 2007). Syngenta had decided to market its genetically engineered corn despite its
lack of regulatory approval for export, prompting strong objections from others in the supply chain,
including the Japanese Feed Trade Association. See Grossman, supra note 27, at 154-56.
112
See Excellence Through Stewardship, Advancing Best Practices in Agricultural Biotechnology,
http://www.excellencethroughstewardship.org/ (self-described as “the first biotechnology industrycoordinated initiative to promote the global adoption of stewardship programs and quality management
systems for the full life cycle of biotechnology-derived plant products”) (last visited July 29, 2010).
113
See, e.g., ASA, Ag-Regulatory Approvals Backgrounder, supra note 90 (ASA supports increasing
funding for the Biotechnology Regulatory Service at APHIS/USDA by $6.0 million to accelerated
approvals of pending applications for new biotech traits); see also Rebecca M. Bratspies, Myths of
Voluntary Compliance: Lessons from the StarLink Corn Fiasco, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 593, 596 (2003).
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crops that might enter export channels.114 The EU also balances complex issues of
national sovereignty that must be taken into consideration when faced with the
attempts of its member states to assert control of their countries’ food supplies and
erect additional barriers against GMOs.115 Another important trading partner, Japan,
maintains its zero tolerance policy for unapproved GMOs as well as strict handling
and labeling guidelines.116
Even more broadly, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety embodies an
international consensus with which U.S. law and trade policy conflict.117 As an
important precedent, the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling on EU-Biotech in
its support of the U.S. position undermined the authority of the Biosafety Protocol,
which allows its member states to take a precautionary approach to regulating GMOs
when there is scientific uncertainty.118 Dennis Olson, Director of the Trade

114

See Strauss, Impact of the WTO, supra note 45, at 808-11 (analyzing the WTO decision in the EU-Biotech
case on the moratorium as well as its impact on current and future EU regulations); see also Thomas P. Redick
& Michael J. Adrian, Do European Union Non-Tariff Barriers Create Economic Nuisances in the United
States?, 1 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 87, 87–88 (2005) (arguing that the EU’s new traceability system for biotech
crops will lead to the proliferation of nontariff barriers affecting biotech crops and proposing legal
mechanisms to prevent liability for those impacted at every stage in the chain of commerce).
115
See Strauss, Impact of the WTO, supra note 45, at 814-21. For more on the implications of this WTO
decision for national sovereignty, see Debra M. Strauss & Melanie C. Strauss, Globalization and National
Sovereignty: Controlling the International Food Supply in the Age of Biotechnology, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
BUS. 75 (2009) (analyzing the implications of the WTO’s food trade dispute decision on nation-state
control in the regulation of its food supply, and multilateral environmental and trade agreements;
concluding that the WTO has exceeded its scope of international trade and that perhaps another
supranational organization should be formed to regulate the world’s food supply as a scientific and policymaking entity that would take into account public health, safety, and sustainability) [hereinafter Strauss &
Strauss, Globalization and National Sovereignty].
116
For a product to be labeled as “Non-GM,” the GM content of the food must fall below 5 percent and the
processor must be able to show that all non-GM ingredients were identity preserved from production
through processing. There are also special guidelines for handling IP corn and soybeans for export to
Japan. See The Organic and Non-GMO Report, supra note 64.
117
Strauss, Impact of the WTO, supra note 45, at 815; Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention
on Biological Diversity (2000), available at http://www.cbd.int/biosafety. The Biosafety Protocol was put
forth in January 2000 and went into effect on September 11, 2003, the ninetieth day after receiving the fifty
instruments of ratification by states or regional economic integration organizations that are parties to the
UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which was adopted in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and has been
ratified by190 parties. See IISD Linkages, A Brief Introduction to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
http://www.iisd.ca/biodiv/cbdintro.html (last updated Feb. 18, 2000). As of August 2010, 193 parties had
ratified the Protocol. The United States, which had signed the CBD, but had not ratified it, is not among
them. For a list of the status of the ratifying parties, see The Convention on Biological Diversity, List of
Parties, http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list.shtml (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). See also Richard J.
Blaustein, The United States needs to join the rest of the world in ratifying the Convention on Biological
Diversity, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 7, 2005.
118
Julia Watson, Eat to Live: Europe, WTO in food fight, UPI, Feb. 10, 2006, available at
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/headlines.cfm?refID=78529. See generally SABRINA SHAW & RISA
SCHWARTZ, UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES, TRADING PRECAUTION:
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND THE WTO, UNU-IAS REPORT (2005), available at
http://www.ias.unu.edu/binaries2/Precautionary%20Principle%20and%20WTO.pdf.
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and Agriculture Project at the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP),
noted that:
There is already a broad international consensus on how to handle
GE crops at the international level established at the Cartagena
Protocol. This consensus acknowledges that each country has the
right to regulate GE crops based on precautionary principles, to
require labeling of GE crops, and to protect farmers and others
from unfair liability arising from the release of GE crops into the
environment and food distribution system. Now, the WTO’s
unelected legal tribunal, at the request of the U.S. government, has
chosen to pre-empt a strong democratic international consensus.119
Critics have identified the problem of disrupted trade and economic loss
caused by these conflicting systems: “The sale in the United States of a biotech crop
that cannot be exported to the E.U. represents an economic threat to crops bound for
export … These crops cannot reach their intended market if the unapproved biotech
crop mixes with it in the field, through pollen drift, a ‘volunteer’ emerging from grain
left on the ground in a prior harvest, or through post-harvest commingling.”120 The
inconsistency with international standards and principles will continue to lead to trade
obstacles until the U.S. biotech industry conforms its practices.121
E.

The Voice of the People: Channeled through Legislation?

Biotechnology companies and the farmers who grow GM crops may face
more potential liability under federal and state statutes in the future. New legislation
has been proposed that has thus far been largely unsuccessful in obtaining approval.122
At the federal level, only bills supporting biotechnology passed during the
most recent five-year period reported by the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology
119

Press Release, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, WTO Ruling on Genetically Engineered Crops
Would Override International, National and Local Protections: Preliminary Ruling Favors U.S. Biotech
Companies Over Precautionary Regulation (Feb. 7, 2006), http://www.iatp.org/iatp/library
/admin/uploadedfiles/WTO_Ruling_on_Genetically_Engineered_Crops_Wou.pdf. See Strauss & Strauss,
Globalization and National Sovereignty, supra note 115, at 86-92 (discussing how decreased economic
nationalism impedes state sovereignty). See generally Robert F. Blomquist, Globoecopragmatism: How to
Think (and How Not to Think) About Trade and the Environment, 55 KAN. L. REV. 129 (2006) (analyzing
PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION (2004), which argues that the WTO erodes
national sovereignty, is undemocratic, exacerbates world poverty, and places economic considerations ahead
of concerns for the environment, animal welfare, and human rights).
120
Redick & Adrian, supra note 114, at 116-17; see also Thomas P. Redick, The Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety: Precautionary Priority in Biotech Crop Approvals and Containment of Commodity Shipments,
18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 51 (2007).
121
See Strauss, A Model of Labeling, supra note 102, at 118-19 (“If neither the U.S. government nor the
industry moves forward to address these risks in a meaningful way, increased public awareness and
pressure from abroad may spark a backlash that further impedes international trade and may eventually
necessitate a ban of GMOs in the U.S. food supply.”).
122
See Strauss, Importing Caution, supra note 3, at 186-87.
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(PIFB) (2001-2006).123 None of the GM-restrictive legislation in this area was enacted,
but several bills were introduced.124 In May 2002, H.R. 4814 was one of five bills
introduced by Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) that sought to expand the
regulation of agricultural biotechnology. H.R. 4812, the Genetically Engineered Crop
and Animal Farmer Protection Act, would “provide additional protections for farmers
and ranchers that may be harmed economically by genetically engineered seeds, plants,
or animals,” establishing a Farmer’s Bill of Rights “to ensure fairness for farmers and
ranchers in their dealings with biotechnology companies that sell genetically engineered
seeds, plants, or animals.”125 Among these protections, the bill would require disclosure
by the biotechnology companies of the legal and environmental risks that the use of the
genetically engineered seeds, plants, or animals may pose to the purchaser; prevent
noncompetitive practices involving technology fees; preclude the biotechnology
company from limiting liability for harm that may result from the release of genetically
engineered material into the environment; and prohibit the sale of certain nonfertile
plant seeds (a seed that is genetically engineered to produce a plant whose seeds are not
capable of reproduction). Finally, H.R. 4816, the Genetically Engineered Organism
Liability Act, would hold biotechnology companies liable to any party for injuries
caused by the release of a genetically engineered organism into the environment.126 The
list of potential injuries included crop failures suffered by farmers, cross pollination of
neighboring farms, and increased insect resistance, as well as health and environmental
impacts on consumers.127 All of these proposals died in subcommittees.
Nevertheless, Rep. Kucinich has again introduced similar bills in the current
Congress.128 The purpose of these bills is:
To provide additional protections for farmers and ranchers that may
be harmed economically by genetically engineered seeds, plants, or
animals, to ensure fairness for farmers and ranchers in their
dealings with biotech companies that sell genetically engineered
seeds, plants, or animals, to assign liability for injury caused by
genetically engineered organisms, and for other purposes.129
The Genetically Engineered Organism Liability Act of 2010 further states
that: “(1) a biotech company shall be liable to any party injured by the release of a
123

Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology (PIFB) Legislative Tracker 2006, Legislative Activity 20012006 Related to Agricultural Biotechnology (Feb. 2007), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploaded
Files/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_Biotechnology/PIFB_Legislative_Tracker.pdf.
124
Id.
125
Genetically Engineered Crop and Animal Farmer Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 4812, 107th Cong. (2002).
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Genetically Engineered Organism Liability Act of 2002, H.R. 4816, 107th Cong. (2002).
127
Id.
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Genetically Engineered Technology Farmer Protection Act, H.R. 5579, 111th Cong. (2010); Genetically
Engineered Food Right to Know Act, H.R. 5577, 111th Cong. (2010); Genetically Engineered Safety ActGenetically Engineered Pharmaceutical and Industrial Crop Safety Act of 2010, H.R. 5578 , 111th Cong.
(2010).
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Id.
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genetically engineered organism into the environment if the injury results from such
genetic engineering; and (2) liability may not be waived or otherwise avoided by
contract.”130 Introduced on June 23, 2010, the bills were submitted to the appropriate
House committees.
The most recent PIFB report on state legislative activity indicates that in
2005, increasing initiatives arose at the state and local levels. Michael Fernandez,
executive director of the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, explained: “As
agricultural biotechnology progresses, and farmers, the food industry and
consumers continue to adapt to it, state legislatures are at the forefront. States
sometimes have little choice but to address new policy issues, even before they
emerge at the federal level.”131 State legislatures increasingly introduced bills that
attempted to preempt local and county initiatives to limit or prohibit GM seeds and
crops, prompted by concerns that local regulations could be inconsistent with, and
more restrictive than, statewide policies.132
In addition, states sought to balance the competing interests of different
stakeholders. While many of the bills supported agricultural biotechnology as a
means of promoting economic growth, others aimed to manage the potential
economic conflicts between farmers who use GM crops and those using
conventional or organic techniques. This category of “liability and contracts”
encompassed 15% of the bills introduced in 2005-2006 and 11% of adopted
legislation in 2005-2006, compared to 3% in 2003-2004.133 Most notable was
legislation proposed in Vermont (“the Farmer Protection Act”) that was vetoed by
the Governor. Prompted by concerns about the unintended presence of GM crops in
conventional and organic crops, this bill (SB 18) would have held manufacturers
strictly liable for damage caused by GM material, while an alternate House version
(HB 309) would have required that manufacturers be found negligent to be held

130

Genetically Engineered Organism Liability Act of 2010, H.R. 5579, 111th Cong. (2010).
PIFB, Report: State Legislatures Continue to Be Active in Addressing Challenges Associated With
Agricultural Biotechnology (June 22, 2006), http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_report_detail.aspx
?id=20040&category=442 [hereinafter PEW Report]; see also Michael R. Taylor, Jody S. Tick & Diane
M. Sherman, Tending the Fields: State & Federal Roles in the Oversight of Genetically Modified Crops
Dec.
2004),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_Bio
(Dec.
technology/Tending_Fields_Biotech1204.pdf (examining the role of state governments in the regulatory
oversight of crops and foods produced using the tools of modern biotechnology).
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Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology (PIFB), Factsheet:
Factsheet: State Legislative Activity Related to
Agricultural Biotechnology in 2005-2006 (February 2007), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploaded
Files/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_Biotechnology/PIFB_State_Legislature_2005-2006 Session.
pdf [hereinafter PEW Legislative Activities].
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PEW Legislative Activities, supra note 132. At the same time, state legislators proposed contrasting
legislation in support of agricultural biotechnology, which constituted the second most prominent category
of bills in 2005-2006, both in terms of introduced bills (22%) and adopted bills (33%). (By comparison, in
2003-2004, 34% of introduced bills and 57% of adopted bills supported biotechnology.) Proposed support
included favorable tax treatment for investment, bond issues for laboratories and infrastructure, and the
establishment of high-level commissions to promote the industry. Bills supportive of biotechnology
combined with preemption bills, comprised two-thirds of adopted bills in 2005-2006, indicating that
adopted legislation in 2005-2006 was “largely supportive of agricultural biotechnology.” Id.
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responsible.134 Some of the proposed legislation aimed to impose moratoria on GM
crops and animals (16%, as compared to 6% in 2003-2004); 8% proposed to
impose labeling requirements (compared to 7%); 9% involved studies and
taskforces (compared to 19%); and 1% concerned crop destruction (compared to a
similarly small number in 2003-2004).135 Through these conflicting bills, the states
attempted to implement coexistence strategies.136
Of the total bills and resolutions introduced in state legislatures in 2005-2006,
27 (20%) passed.137 Most of the new state laws supported biotechnology, disallowed
local and county initiatives, or criminalized the destruction of crops. Only a few of the
many labeling bills introduced were adopted: Alaska enacted a labeling statute (SB 25),
which requires that GM fish be conspicuously labeled before being sold for human
consumption; Maine provided for voluntary labeling of foods designated as GM free
(LD 1733); and Vermont mandated labeling of seed as GM (HB 777).138 In addition,
one bill on the subject of liability and agricultural contracts previously became law in
Illinois.139
Calls have been renewed for a greater statutory response, particularly on the
state level.140 Some experts prefer these decisions be made by the legislatures rather
than the courts: “An appropriate statutory and regulatory regime enacted with the
purpose of establishing standards of care for growers of GE crops would place the
important policy questions presented by gene flow squarely in the hands of the political
branches of government.”141 As the voice of consumers grows stronger, and as word of
contamination and potentially other incidents spreads, so do the prospects that United
States may react to a changing political climate with the passage of new federal and
state legislation that clearly delineates liability for the future harms caused by
genetically modified crops and GMOs in food.
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See A. Bryan Endres, Coexistence Strategies in a Biotech World: Exploring Statutory Grower
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See, e..g., Cox, supra note 3 (proposing state legislation); Walker & Doerfler, supra note 73 (addressing
statutory action in Missouri); DREW L. KERSHAN, PROPOSED LIABILITY FOR TRANSGENIC CROPS 3 (2005),
available at http://www.legis.state.ia.us/lasdocs/IntComHand/2006/IHDLA016.pdf.
141
Cannon, supra note 22, at 679 (preferring legislative and administrative statements on standards of care
to the courts’ in private tort actions); see also Kanchana Kariyawasam, Legal Liability, Intellectual
Property and Genetically Modified Crops: Their Impact on World Agriculture, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J.
459, 482 (2010) (analyzing the level of protection provided by Australia’s Gene Technology Act of 2000
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR INDUSTRY AND THE STAKEHOLDERS
In considering the best measures to manage these risks, first and foremost
would be a U.S. regulatory approach that would implement labeling, monitoring, and
a stringent pre-market approval process.142 The most effective notification
mechanism both for consumers in the United States and importers from abroad would
be mandatory positive labeling indicating the presence or possible presence of
GMOs—those products “made with GM ingredients” or that “may contain
genetically modified ingredients.” Voluntary negative labeling for foods that are “not
made with GM processes” or “not produced through bioengineering,” while a
positive marketing tool to consumers, alone will not be adequate.143 Following the
recommendations of the National Research Council, the United States should
implement a safety assessment prior to and after commercialization, involve federal
agencies in the determination, use standardized sampling methodologies, and
improve tracing and tracking methods.144 Changes in the storage and transportation
structure are also necessary to segregate more effectively biotechnology agricultural
products from conventional varieties.145
In addition, legislation should be passed—preferably on the federal level to
prevent a patchwork of inconsistent state laws—that would clearly place liability onto
the manufacturers of GM products. Local grass roots initiatives to further protect
gardens and farmlands from GMOs contamination should not be suppressed at either
the state or federal level. The ownership of these products has already been
established through patents. Making tort law consistent with intellectual property law
would be both logical and sound as a matter of public policy. With ownership comes
great responsibility and—depending on how those products are conceived and
produced—potential liability.
Liability would most appropriately be based on a torts theory where
manufacturers would be held strictly liable for the injuries caused by their biotech
products, including harm to the environment, human health, and economic loss due to
loss of international markets.146 Holding biotech companies liable for the results of
their genetic engineering would comport with public policy because it would shift
liability to those best able to control the product, ensure its safety, conduct rigorous
testing, and disseminate critical information such as the size of buffer zones needed
142
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around GM plants. This approach would put responsibility and thus incentives in the
proper place. In the absence of regulation by the FDA and USDA/APHIS, the biotech
companies are in the best position to self-police their genetically engineered creations
and more likely to do so if they will be held accountable for any injuries that flow as
a consequence.
The most difficult hurdle for potential plaintiffs in cases involving
environmental and human injury will be proving causation but, like the tobacco
industry model, when a scientific breakthrough in this area occurs through studies
and unfortunately an incident or health crisis, liability and change will follow. It
would be in the best interests of the industry as well as the public to be proactive and
work to be sure that these products do not carry such risks. In the face of current
scientific uncertainty, who should bear the risks of these products? In the U.S.
regulatory world the answer of the responsible agencies charged in this area has been
the public. Unlike the stringent regulatory approach of the EU and the international
community which reacts in the opposite manner to the scientific uncertainty and
places the burden on the biotech companies to prove safety before allowing these
products into the market, the United States takes a laissez faire approach and does not
provide a regulatory structure or special restrictions for these products.147
While it would be preferable to restrict GM products at the outset before
they have been let loose on the public in its food supply, this approach does not
appear to be on the horizon. As a conservative estimate, more than 75 percent of the
products in U.S. grocery stores contain GM ingredients.148 Most recently, the FDA
has extended this approach and, arguably, exacerbated this situation by approving the
use of milk and meat from cloned animals without labeling or monitoring, using the
same reasoning of “substantial equivalence” that it has used for GM foods.149
At the same time, organics are becoming big business. Americans’
purchases have increased by twenty percent each year and organic producers are
being bought out by big companies like Kellogg and Kraft; even megastores like
Walmart have added organic food lines admittedly because of the economics driven
by customer preferences.150 Consumer demand is filling the void left by
147
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administrative agencies and the government.151 Perhaps the private sector can
likewise spur the biotech industry to make food safety a priority.
As a general matter, the business world prefers certainty and clear standards
to meet.152 Ironically, in the absence of federal standards, the industry cannot avail
itself of the state of the art or government specification defenses.153 Shifting this
dilemma to the private sector in the lawsuit arena would, paradoxically, provide some
structure to manage the risks. A clear federal statute demarking liability would
provide the most certain signal to the stakeholder parties. If that does not come to
pass, the common law of torts will step in to fill the void, plaintiff by plaintiff, and
ultimately through the powerful class action vehicle.154
It should be noted that assumption of risk could not be used as a defense to a
product liability claim by the biotech industry unless the products were clearly
labeled as genetically modified and the public warned of any potential hazards. The
consumer must be aware of whether a product contains GM ingredients, along with
the potential risks; and voluntarily assume these risks through their purchases and
intentional ingestion of these foods.155 Of course, this labeling and informational
campaign approach would only enable the assumption of risk defense to be raised; a
151
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jury would still have to be satisfied that these risks were clearly undertaken by the
consumer. Moreover, a manufacturer’s responsibility to the public and greater ability
to minimize these risks should ultimately be given more weight in the equation to
assess liability. Nonetheless, there may be reduced costs in the form of a significantly
diminished risk of liability from lawsuits, at least with respect to potential claims for
injuries that may occur due to a failure to warn.156 Since such labeling and warnings
are not currently required under federal law, voluntary labeling and information
dissemination would be a wise approach for biotech.

V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the risks of harm to human health and the environment, as
translated into these multifaceted layers of legal liability, may justify a moratorium or
ban in the use of GMOs in food and commercial medical applications. Until then,
individual farmers would be better able to make choices about whether to plant GM
crops if they are made aware of their potential liability and given critical information
such as the need for sufficient buffer zones and proper segregation methods—
including the cost of leaving large tracts of their land fallow, testing their crops, and
cleaning their equipment—in order to minimize their legal jeopardy. Through their
own evaluation of costs and benefits, these farmers may decide that any involvement
with GMOs is not worth engendering these hazards and expenses. Perhaps additional
measures can be developed to protect non-GM farmers and empower them to
segregate and protect their crops, such as developing a non-GM certification and
requiring special handling before their products enter the domestic market or export
channels.157
Most importantly, biotech companies must be sent a clear message that they
will be held financially accountable for the harm caused by their genetically
engineered products—injuries and damages that are no longer merely theoretical. As
landmark multimillion dollar cases such as the LibertyLink® rice litigation proceed
through the courts, this message is reaching a crescendo. Perhaps statutory liability
and a transformation in the regulatory regime will follow. Through this risk analysis,
the industry might be persuaded that safety is good business to ensure that, in the
long-run, they continue to reap what they sow.
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